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Summary  findings
Forming  a regional  grouping  with  neighboring  nations  Under  various  conditions  for  entry,  the  model  is used
may  be one way  for microstates  to overcome  a major  to determine  the  equilibrium  group  size, which  is shown
problem:  Because  of their  weak  bargaining  power  and  to be  positively  correlated  with  the number  of  issues to
high  fixed  costs of negotiation,  microsrates  are  at a  be tackled,  the degree  of similarity  among  countries,  and
severe  disadvantage  in dealing  with  the  rest of the  world.  the  per-issue  costs  of international  negotiation.
They  don't  have the  hunman and  physical  resources  to  They  use the  case of the  Caribbean  Conmmunity
unilaterally  conduct  the various  bilateral  and  mnultilaterai  (CARICOM)  to show  the  model's  relevance  in the  r eal
negotiations  a developing  nation  typically  conducts.  world.  The countries  that  belong  to CARICOM  pooled
Andriamananiara and Schiff present a model in which  their negotiating resources and formulated common
the decision to form, expand, or join a regional "club" is  policy stances. Despite its relatively limited impact on
based on reduced negotiating costs and increased  trade and investments, CARICOM served as a political
bargaining power,  rather than on the traditionial costs  instrument in joint negotiations on trade and investment
and benefits of trade integration (which might be  with larger countries and regional trade blocs. By
miniscule for a microstate and might even generate  establishing a union, the CARICOM counitries succeeded
welfare losses).  in making their voices heard on a variety of issues in a
way none  of them  could  have  done  alone.
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Thanks are due to Alan Winters  for useful comments  on an earlier  draft of the paper.1. Introduction
"Microstates"l  face severe disadvantages  in their dealing with the rest of the world due to low
bargaining  power and high fixed costs of negotiation. Due to their small size, microstates  do not
usually possess the needed human and physical capacities to unilaterally conduct the various
bilateral and multilateral  negotiations  that are typical for developing  nations. In addition  to the
traditional  costs and benefits  of regionalism  which  are widely  discussed  in the literature,  forming
a regional  grouping  with neighboring  nations  may help a country  share  its fixed negotiation  costs
and increase its bargaining  power. And, as the world has become  increasingly  more integrated
and the number of issues to be dealt with in the international  arena has grown, the need for
microstates  to integrate  with their  neighbors  has grown as well.
This paper presents a model in which the decision to form, expand or join a regional
grouping  is based on negotiation  costs and bargaining  power rather than on the traditional  costs
and benefits  of trade integration. This is particularly  relevant  in the context of microstates  where
trade integration itself might only bring minuscule benefits given the narrow range and the
similarity of goods produced.  Such integration is in fact likely to  generate welfare losses.
Panagaryia (1995) shows under some realistic assumptions that a regional trade integration
between  small countries  whose terms of trade are given exogenously  results in a welfare loss for
the bloc as a whole2.
I The term "microstate",  according  to the definition  of the United  Nations,  denotes  a state  with a
population  numbering  one million  or less. In this paper, the term is broadly  used to denote  very
small  countries.
2A  similar analysis  is found in Schiff  (1997),  where  it is shown  that this result  need not hold in
the case of smuggling.
2The main benefits of  integration among microstates are likely to be the  savings in
negotiation  costs and the enhanced bargaining  power.  Small Caribbean  nations, for example,
have increased  their bargaining  power through  the establishment  of the Caribbean  Community
(CARICOM)  under which they have pooled their negotiation  resources and have formulated
common  policy stances 3.
In order to understand  the basic questions  addressed  in this paper, consider a number of
microstates,  each of which  has to negotiate  with a multitude  of international  agencies  on different
issues. One scenario (the non-cooperative  one) would be that each country sets its own policy
stances and  unilaterally negotiates with  all  the  foreign agencies. Another scenario (the
cooperative  one) would be one where a subset (or possibly all) of the countries set their joint
positions  through some regional  negotiation  mechanism. A regional  authority (a "Secretariat"),
then, defends  the countries'  common  economic  or political interests in the negotiations  with the
rest of the world. The questions  addressed  below are: (i) Under what circumstances  would the
latter scenario  be the chosen arrangement  between  the countries,  (ii) what would the equilibrium
group size be, and (iii) what would  the optimal  group size be? 4
Forming  a regional  grouping  is likely to have a number  of attractive  characteristics  from
the  point of  view of  each individual countries.  First,  international negotiations require
substantial  financial resources, time and expert knowledge  that are limited in microstates and
could be used more efficiently in other areas.  Microstates can gain by  acting together in
3 The case of CARICOM  is discussed  in further  detail in Section  4.
4  As argued  later,  the optimal group size may differ  from the equilibrium  one due to
externalities.
3articulating shared interests and sharing the  fixed costs of international negotiation.  Combining
their negotiations resources would give them larger market power, and thus, larger negotiation
power.  For  instance,  the establishment  of  a regional  union  allows  the  countries to  play  the
"logrolling"  game ("I vote for your  issue if  you vote for mine") by trading  support for each
5 other's issues which might help them get what they could not get on an unilateral basis5.
Second, the existence of a visible regional authority may attract more foreign aid since it
is easier  for the  donor community to  deal with  the group  as  one  entity rather  than  to  deal
individually with each single country.  Common regional  activities have emerged in order to
attract higher volumes of external financial resources (Inotai,  1991).  It is more attractive for
USAID or the EU to provide assistance to CARICOM than to give aid to St. Kitts and Nevis, to
Belize and to others individually.
On the other hand, by joining a regional group, a country may have to sacrifice some of
its  preferred  positions  even  before the  international negotiation  process  begins.  The  group
members will need to agree on an negotiation platform among themselves.  The process leading
to this platform could be costly and cumbersome, especially if the group size is large.  Setting up
a Secretariat, or deciding on its institutional characteristics  might also require a lot of resources
and  expertise.  However, if the countries  are similar, it is  likely  that they will have  similar
preferences.  This will reduce the cost of reaching a joint policy stance.
5On the issue of regiornalism  versus multilateralism, it has been argued that if small countries
negotiate as a group, then the efficiency of the negotiations will increase, and a satisfactory
worldwide multilateral agreement will be more likely (Frankel and Wei, 1995; Krugman, 1993).
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By establishing a regional Club ,  the member countries save on the costs of international
negotiation,  but  incur the  costs of  negotiating  between themselves  to  reach  common policy
stances.  In other words, they avoid duplication of external bargaining costs but incur, instead,
internal bargaining costs.  The equilibrium agreement will depend on the relative importance of
the two types of costs as well as on any benefits from enhanced bargaining power.
The paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, a model based on negotiation costs
is built and some implications are presented.  The likelihood of the establishment of a regional
grouping as well as the group size are shown to depend on the membership condition, the degree
of similarity among the countries, the degree of autonomy of the regional secretariat, and the
number of issues to be negotiated.  In the real world, this latter may sometimes be an endogenous
variable, that is: countries choose the number of issues that would maximize their net benefits.
In the third section, the basic model is modified to take account of this possibility.  The results
from the second section are not  dramatically altered.  It is shown that the possibility of  log-
rolling increases both the likelihood of collective action and the equilibrium group size.  Section
4 presents a case study of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) which is a good example of a
regional grouping between microstates.  Section 5 concludes.
6 Sandler (1992) defines Club as "... a voluntary collective that derives mutual benefits from
sharing one or more of the following: production costs, the members' characteristics, or an
impure public good characterized by excludable benefits."
52.  The basic model
Imagine  n microstates  each  of which  needs  to negotiate  with  m different  foreign  agencies,  i.e.,
there  are m issues. There  are two types  of negotiation  costs. First,  there are the "international
costs". For  each  issue,  an entity  incurs  a negotiation  cost,  x, when  dealing  with  a foreign  entity.
In case  of an alliance  between  symmetric  microstates,  this cost is assumed  to be equally  shared
between  all members. The (per-issue)  international  cost  incurred  by a member  of a n-country
alliance  dealing  with  m  issues  is written  as:
x
(1)  C, = '
n
Obviously,  this cost goes down  as the number  of participating  members  increases. In case of
unilateral  action  by a country,  the whole  international  cost is borne  by that country,  that is, a
country  acting  unilaterally  (n  = 1)  pays  x.
Second,  countries  forming  an alliance  incur  "regional  costs". They  consist  of the costs
of negotiation  between  the members  in order  to reach  common  policy  stances. The "per-issue"
regional  cost  is expected  to be positively  related  to the group  size and negatively  related  to the
number  of issues.  Firstly, reaching  an agreement  becomes  harder, thus more costly, as the
number  of participants  rises. It could  also  be argued  that the larger  the group  size,  the more  each
country  has  to move  away  from  its preferred  positions  in order  to accommodate  the group's  joint
positions. Secondly,  as the number  of issues  increases,  the "per-issue"  regional  costs will
6decrease  due to scale and scope  economies 7. These economies  are likely  to be strong since, at the
regional  level,  part of the negotiators  are likely  to remain  the same  people even  though the issues
are changing.  Negotiation  resources  will be spread  over different  issues. As the number  of issues
increases, the degree of trust and familiarity between the negotiators  will augment and thus,
negotiations  will become  more efficient. Also, it is easier to make trade-offs  between issues as
their number increases 8. The (per-issue)  regional  cost paid by a country  dealing with m issues is
written  as:
(2)  CR = (n -1)a.y(m),
where  y > 0, y' < 0, y " < 0, 0 ￿  a  < 19.  y(m) is the cost of negotiating  with an individual  partner
country for each issue.  a  is the elasticity  of the regional costs with respect to the number of
partner countries  in the group or club. It represents  the degree  of similarity  of the countries  (e.g.,
language, legal framework, shared natural resources, main exports ...) and/or the  degree of
autonomy of the decision-making  entity (the Secretariat)' 0. If a=  1, the regional cost can be
7 Economies  of scope  are cost savings  that arise when activities  have a common  cost (Sandler,
1992).
8 For more  on this argument,  see Section  3.2. on log-rolling.
For convenience,  n is treated  as a continuous  variable,  where n e [, nmAx  ] and nhux  is the total
number  of potential  members. The regional  negotiation  cost, CR, is normalized  in such a way
that  when n = 1, CR = 0. Note that treating  n as a discrete  variable  does not alter the main
results of the analysis.
10  One would  expect  the degree  of autonomy  of the secretariat  to increase  as the degree  of
similarity  among  the nations  rises. Evidently,  a could  also vary according  to the issue being
negotiated  as well as over time. For simplicity,  however,  it is assumed  that a  is a given
constant.
7written as  (n - l).y(m)  . This represents the case where countries are very different from each
other, and a formal Secretariat is not established, but where the countries still act collectively, so
that each country has to negotiate with each of the other (n - 1) individual countries over the m
issues.  On the other hand, a small  a  means that the countries are quite similar, and most of the
regional policymaking is delegated to the supranational Secretariat.  Therefore, the n countries do
not  have to  conduct substantial negotiations between themselves  and the group  size becomes
almost irrelevant.  For a = 0, (say in the case of countries forming a political union), the regional
cost per country is minimized at level y(m), and is independent of n. Note also that if a country
acts unilaterally (n =  1), its regional cost is zero.  Finally, as can be shown from equation (2), the
larger is  a --i.e., the more countries are different  from each  other-- the  faster regional  costs
increase with an expansion of the group.
Putting  the  international  and  the  regional  costs  together,  a  country's  (per-issue)
negotiation costs can be expressed as:
(3)  C(n, m) = C, + CR =+  (n -1)  y(m).
n
-is  convex while (n-l)'y(m)  is concave in n, so that C(n,m) can either be concave or convex in
n
n.  However, when x is large or n is not too large, convexity will dominate (for instance, for n
around 1, C(n,m) will be approximately  x  which is convex). In this paper, C(n,m) is assumed to
n
8be convex in n, or Cnn > 0.  Note from equation (3) that C(l,m)  = x, i.e., a country negotiating
unilaterally will save on regional costs but will have to pay the entire international negotiation
costs.
The "gross"  payoff  that each country receives  from acting  unilaterally,  denoted R(1),
differs from the payoff that it receives from acting collectively, R(n).  It is conjectured that the
(per issue) gross payoff from collective action, R(n),  is an increasing and concave function of
group size n.  This reflects the "bargaining power" hypothesis (i.e., by negotiating as a group, the
member  countries  get  more  influence  on  the  world  market  and  increase  their  bargaining
power)'1 . It  could  also  reflect  the  argument  presented  in  the previous  section  that  foreign
investment and foreign aid are more attracted to a group of microstates acting collectively than to
a multitude of microstates acting unilaterally partly because of lower transactions  costs, partly
because of more visibility as a group than as individual countries.
The "net" benefit of being a member, N(n,m), is then written as:
(4)  N(n, m) = m.[R(n) -C(n, m)].
Given the assumptions about the convexity of C(n,m) in n and the concavity of R(n), N(n,m) is
concave (see Curve AB in Figure  1).  N(n,m) is the objective function used in determining the
1 Members of the Cairns group are not microstates, but by coordinating their positions and
putting them together coherently, they most likely lowered the group's negotiation costs (most
studies were done in Australia), and they obtained favorable results at the Uruguay Round:
agriculture finally included in the negotiations, no QRs on agriculture by the EU and the US
(only tariffs), and no new subsidies and commitment to lower old ones.
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Outsiders  apply for membership  J4o not apply)equilibrium group size. Assume for now that the number of issues is fixed at some exogenous
level12. For a given number of issues, a representative country will choose its preferred group
size by maximizing its net-benefits, which yields the first-order condition:
(5)  (  'N(nm.(R-  CJ)  O=
where Xa denotes the derivative of X (X = R or C) with respect to variable a (a = n or m).
In terms of the  group as  a whole,  the  Total  or Aggregate Net  Benefit  (TB)  and the
Average Net Benefit (AB) can be respectively written as:
(6)  TB = n. N(n, m) = n. m.  [R(n) - C(n, m)],
and,
TB (7)  AB=-  =N(n, m)
n
There are two types  of players in the model: the "insiders"  and the "outsiders".  The
insiders are the countries that are already members of the club (or bloc) and are contemplating
whether or not to let new members in.  They will accept entry as long as they benefit from it. For
any given n and m, an outsider will want to join an alliance if the net benefit associated with
acting collectively is larger than that associated with acting unilaterally.
12 In the next section, the number of issues is endogenized.
10The extra net-benefit  to the group of admitting  a new member or the Marginal  Total Net
Benefit  (MB) can expressed  as:
o7V(n,  m) (8)  MB = N(n, m) + n.
The socially optimal group size (for insiders and outsiders together) is defined as the
point where the total net benefit for the insiders and outsiders is maximized, or where the
marginal total net benefit  (MB) to the group of an extra member equals the net benefit foregone
by that new member,  N(l,m).  The socially  optimal  n  * must,  then, satisfy:
dVJ(n*,m)_ (9)  MB(n, m) = N(n', m) +  nm  N(1  )
which  is represented  by point C in Figure 1. This assumes  an interior  solution. Such  a solution
will obtain  as long as a  is not too small so that n  <  nmax,  where  nmax is the total number  of
potential  members. In the extreme  case where a = 0, AB will rise continuously  as n increases
and N(n,m)  would  always  be larger than N(l,m). A corner solution  would  be obtained  and the
optimal  size will be n  =-  max.
It is important  to realize  that in the case of an interior solution,  the optimal  group size for
the insiders and the equilibrium  group size are not necessarily  the same as the socially optimal
size due to the presence  of externalities. Outsiders  seeking  membership  do not take into account
11the effects of their action on the existing insiders.  The equilibrium group size depends on the
membership  or  entry  conditions.  Three  such  conditions  are  considered:  Free  or  Open
Membership, Selective Membership (without entry fee) and  Selective Membership (with entry
fee).
2.1  Free or Open Membership
Consider first the case where any outsider that wishes to enter a group can do so without any
resistance from the insiders.  The outsider would want to be a member as long as the net benefit
associated  with  acting  collectively  is  larger  than  that  associated  with  acting  unilaterally.
Outsiders will seek (and will be granted) membership  as long as:
(10)  N(n,m) 2 N(l,m).
This is represented by the range AD in Figure  1. The associated equilibrium group size, nF will
satisfy the above condition with an equality.  In this case, the equilibrium group size is larger
than the socially optimal one (nF > n*) and than the group size which maximizes the insiders'
welfare (nF > nN). The group is too  large compared to the optimum because the outsiders are
entering the club without taking into account the congestion or negative externalities they impose
on the insiders (beyond point L in Figure 1) by raising regional negotiation costs by more than
they are lowering international negotiation costs and raising the gross benefit. The outsiders are
dissipating all the potential welfare gains from forming a regional agreement.  In Figure  1, the
12loss to the insiders  (fromn  not being at the socially  optimal  group size n  *but  at nF)  is the rectangle
EGJH. At the equilibrium,  the outsiders  are indifferent  between  acting unilaterally  (and getting
N(nF,m) = N(l,m)) and acting collectively  (and getting N(l,m)) so they neither gain nor lose.
Relative to the optimum,  the total welfare  loss to the union is then  the rectangle  EGJH. Note that
this case is identical  to that of a common  property resource (a fishery, road, open fields, etc.)
where outsiders can enter freely and thereby drive the value of the resource down to zero.
Compared to  the  situation where each country is  acting unilaterally, this  case offers no
improvement  in terms of welfare since  the net benefit  to each country,  whether it is an insider  or
an outsider, is still N(nF,  m) = N(l, m).
2.2  Selective Membership  without Entryfee
Consider next the case where the insiders can choose whether to let outsiders in but cannot
extract  any side payments  from them. On the one hand, the insiders  will accept a new member  as
long as the entry of that country  is favorable  to them by increasing  (or by not decreasing)  the
average  net benefit  (AB'I. This will happen  for any n less than nN at point B in Figure 1. On the
other hand, an outsider will apply for membership  as long as the net benefit  associated  with
being a member  (N(n,m))  is more than  the net benefit associated  with being an outsider  (N(l,m)).
This is the case as long as the group size is less than nF  at point D.  Consequently,  the
equilibrium  group size is represented  by point B which  is the size that maximizes  the net benefit
N(n,m) for the insiders. Analytically,  it can be computed,  by setting  the derivative  of N(n,m)  to
zero, that the equilibrium  group size,  nN, satisfies  the condition:
13(1)  o7N(nN  IM) =m(R,,  - CJ) = O .
In this case, the equilibrium group size is smaller than the socially optimal size, (nN < n *) 13  The
reason is that  the insiders are concerned with  their own private welfare and  do not  take the
potential gains for the new entrants into account.  The insiders use their selective advantage to
act like monopolists and choose a suboptimally small group size.  In Figure 1, the insiders gain
the area HILK for being at nN  and not at the optimal n*.  The outsiders experience a loss for
being prevented from joining  the group.  This loss is represented by the rectangle FGJI.  The
global welfare loss is represented by the difference between FGJI and HILK, or alternatively by
area FGL4.
It should be pointed out that this case offers some welfare improvement compared to the
situation where each country is acting unilaterally.  The gain is represented by EFLK in Figure 1.
The insiders capture  all the gain, in  this "second  best"  solution, since they are now getting
N(nN,m) > N(l,m)  instead of N(l,m)  which  they would have gotten had they not formed a club.
2.3  Selective Membership  with Entry Fee
In this  last case, an outsider who wishes to join the club can induce the insiders to  accept its
membership by making some side payment. The insiders would accept the membership of the
13 This is, as in the previous case, assuming an interior solution.
14  FGL is the difference between the marginal benefit of being an insider between nN and n * and
the actual benefit as an outsider of N(l,m).
14new country as long as the  payment  is enough to cover (for each of the existing insiders) the
decrease  in the Average  Net Benefit due to the new entry. In order  to compensate  the insiders,  a
new member  has to pay at least (the negative  of):
o9N(n,  m)
(12)  n.  -MB-AB,
which is the negative externality  imposed on the insiders and is equal to the vertical distance
between the curves AB and MB beyond  nN.  An outsider  would  be willing to make the payment
as long as the Average  Net Benefit of joining minus  the amount of the payment  (AB - Payment
MB) is larger than the net benefit associated  with acting unilaterally  (N(l,m)).  An outsider's
maximum  willingness  to pay is then the difference  between  AB and  N(1,m).
The determination of  the equilibrium entry fee is  shown in  Figure 2  for ease of
presentation. The demand (or the outsider's maximum  willingness  to pay) for membership  is
15 represented  by the curve  AB - N(1,  m) and the supply  by the curve AB - MB  . If the insiders  are
acting competitively,  in the sense that they do not discriminate  between different  applicants,  the
equilibrium  entry fee and the equilibrium  group size are determined  by the intersection  of the
two curves. The equilibrium  entry fee, GJ, is the outsider's maximum  willingness  to pay at that
particular group size and is also the minimum  rate that the insiders are willing to accept from
new members.
5 AB - MB is shown  as, but not necessarily  is, a straight  line.
15Figure  2: Determination  of Equilibrium  Entry Fee
AB-MB,  AB - MB
AB- C(l,m)  L  Supply  of Membership
.....  ..  .. ..  ......................................  ...  ...  ..... ,
/  Equ~~~ilibrium  Entry/\
/  \  ~~~~~~AB  - N(l, m)
Demand  for Entry
0  /=In this case, there will be new entry up to point C which is the socially  optimal  size, n*.
In terms  of Figure 1, between  A and B, a newcomer  does not make any payment  since  its entry is
beneficial  to the insiders  in the sense that it increases  the average  benefits. Between  B and C,
any new member has to pay an entry fee of GJ.  Beyond point C, outsiders will find acting
unilaterally more attractive  than joining the group since the insiders would charge them more
than what they are willing to pay (for instance,  at point M in Figure 2, outsiders  are willing to
pay NM but insiders  require MQ > MN). The equilibrium  group size is at point C.
The possibility  of taxing  the newcomers  for the negative  externalities  that they impose  or,
alternatively,  the possibility  for outsiders  to compensate  the insiders  by paying  an entry fee,
generates  the socially  optimal  group size by resolving  the collective  action  problem. On the one
hand,  the fact that a newcomer  has to pay to get in limits the chances  that the club becomes
inefficiently  large. On the other hand,  the fact  that an outsider  can get in by paying  reduces  the
chances  that the group becomes  inefficiently  small.  The total welfare  loss (with  respect  to the
optimal  group size) is then equal to zero.  Compared  to the case  where no payment  was allowed
(Section  2.2.), the insiders  gain FGL  and the outsiders  lose nothing  so that the total welfare  gain
is FGL. Finally,  compared  to the case where  each country  acts unilaterally,  this "first best"
solution  offers a welfare  improvement  which is represented  by EGJH. All of this gain  is
captured  by the insiders. Outsiders  always  receive  N(1L,  m). In terms of Figure 1,  the "new"
insiders  (between  B and C) pay GJ and receive  CJ, with a net benefit  of CG = N(l,m), i.e., the
"new" insiders  do not gain. The entire efficiency  gain accrues  to the "original"  insiders.
16Baldwin (1993) presents  a domino  theory of regionalism  where bloc formation increases
the willingness  of outsiders  to join.  However,  he does not examine  the willingness  of insiders  to
let outsiders  in.  In this paper, we examine  both the incentives  of insiders and outsiders. Once
two countries  form a bloc, since AB increases  initially,  other countries  will want to join and the
insiders will be willing to let them in.  This will happen up to bloc size nN where AB is
maximized,  and up to the socially  optimal bloc size n* if the outsiders are allowed to pay an
entry fee.
It should be stated that the above analysis is implicitly  based on the assumption  that the
outsiders  do not take the initiative  (or do not have  the option)  to form another  club of their own.
If they were allowed to do so, then the outsiders would stop applying for membership to an
existing group  once the size of the latter reaches  nN (the size which  maximizes  AB)  regardless  of
the membership  condition  because  they could form an alternative  group of size nN.  As a result,
more than one bloc of size nN  could emerge, depending  on the size of nmax relative to nN.
T'he assumption made in this paper is, however, legitimate if it is further assumed that the
expansion  of a group's membership  is incremental  or sequential  ("one new member at a time")
and not simultaneous  ("one shot").  This is in fact the case for CARICOM  (see Section  4)16.
Under  this situation,  it is always advantageous  for an outsider  to join a nN-member  group rather
than to start a 2-member  club with another  outsider.
16 Note that this also holds for various RIAs  among  non-microstates.  Argentina  and Brazil  first
started  integrating,  and then Uruguay  and Paraguay  decided  to join them. In Europe,  Belgium,
Netherlands  and Luxembourg  formed  the BENELUX,  then with France,  Germany  and Italy
created  EC-6,  then came  EC-9,  EC-10, EC-12,  EC-15,  etc. Similarly,  Canada and the US formed
CUSFTA,  then later formed  NAFTA  with Mexico.
172.4  Comparative Statics
The following implicalions follow directly from the above analysis and apply to each one  of the
three cases considered.
(i) The equilibrium group size increases with the number of issues (m). Most microstates
have limited administrative, managerial and negotiating resources. Thus, as the number of issues
increases, countries will tend to seek regional cooperation. An increase in the number of issues
expands the AB and the MB schedules to the north-east (to AB'  and MB'  respectively), as is
shown in  Figure  3, and that, in  turn, increases the equilibrium group size irrespective of the
existing  membership  condition  (from  B,  C,  and  D  to  B',  C'  and  D'  respectively)17.
Algebraically, it can be calculated that an increase in m (causing a decrease in y(m)) will increase
n*, nF, and nN respectively 8. This reflects the presence of  "economies of scope" at the regional
level.  Due  to  the  presence  of  fixed  costs  (same  negotiators-different  issues),  "per-issue"
negotiation costs will decrease as the number of issues increases.
(ii) The equilibrium group size increases as the degree of similarity among the countries
or the degree of autonomy of the Secretariat increases (or a decreases). Institutional arrangement
affects the behavior of the countries.  As  a  decreases, it does not  cost  as much to reach  a
common  position  (i.e., regional  costs  decrease).  As  a  result, joining  a  club  becomes  more
attractive  and  the  equilibrium  group  size  rises  in  each  of  the  three  cases  discussed  above.
17 It is not shown but all three curves (AB, MB and N(1, m) ) in Figure 3 are also shifting up.
18 Using  (11) we get  ŽZN  C..  >  °
18Figure 3: Comparative  Statics:  Increases  in m or a decrease  in a
AB, MBt
MB'
N(l, m)  . \
'l  B'  l  .DAf,  AB'
A=-1  B  B'  C  D  C'  DGraphically (Figure 3), the AB and the MB schedules expand to the north-east and the different
equilibria (B ,C ,D) shift to the right (to B',  C',  D'  respectively). It can also be demonstrated
algebraically that a decrease in a will raise n  *, nF, and nN respectively 19. As  a  decreases,  the
savings on international costs (being shared by more members) become more important than the
increase in regional costs (arising with a larger number of members).  In the extreme case where
a  = 0  (the  Secretariat  is  completely  autonomous or  the  countries  are  very  similar),  acting
collectively would always be more attractive that acting unilaterally and having more members
would always be more advantageous than having fewer members.  In this case, the group size
will be  the maximum size possible as AB is increasing asymptotically with n.
From a dynamic standpoint, assume that as member countries negotiate jointly over time,
the degree of trust in each other rises, and a falls, i.e., a  = a(t),  a'  < 0.  Then, n  *, nF, and nN
will rise over time.  See, e.g., the case study of CARICOM in Section 4.  Alternatively, it could
be assumed that, for a given m, y(m) falls over time as  the regional negotiation process becomes
more and more efficient. In this case also, one would see n  , nF, and nN  rise over time.
(iii) The equilibrium group size increases as the per-issue international negotiation costs
increase  or the regional  costs decrease  for any  given number of  issues (x increases or y(m)
decreases).  Changes  iin the negotiation  costs  affect the  incentives of countries to  undertake
collective action.  For instance. when the international negotiation costs rise, countries gain more
from forming a regiornal grouping by  sharing the now-larger international negotiation  costs.
C
19Using  (11) we get  "'  >0
,9a  R,,  -C.
19Graphically,  the AB and MB schedules  in Figure 3 move  to the right and down and N(J, m) goes
down (not shown). This results in an increase  in the equilibrium  group size irrespective  of the
entry condition. Algebraically  it can be shown that an increase  in x (and a decrease  in y(m)) will
increase  n*, nF, and nN respectively20.
(iv) The equilibrium  number  of issues increases  with the group size.  This result is shown
in Section  3.1 below.
3.  Some Extensions  of the Basic  Model
In the next  two subsections,  we extend  the basic model  by endogenizing  the number  of issues.
3.1  Endogenous m and n
In this case, a representative  country simultaneously  chooses its preferred  group size and number
of issues by maximizing  its net-benefits. For simplicity  of exposition,  we will consider  the case
where  membership  is selective  and there is no entry  fee so that the decisions  regarding  the group
size and number of issues is up to the insiders. For a given m, n = nN in this case (see Section
2.2). The solution  under other  entry conditions  can be obtained  by analogy. Maximization  of net
benefit  with respect  to n and m yields  two first order  conditions:
20Using  (1l)we get  - =  C  >0,  and - - = R"  <0.
20(13) Club Size  =(n,m)  = °,  and
(14) Number of issues  =  m) =0.
Lin
The first condition  (Club  Size) gives  us the equilibrium  group size for a given  number  of
issues  or nN(m). It can be shown  that as the number  of issues increases,  nN increases  as well.
Totally  differentiating  (13),  we get:
(15)  '  N  C.  > 0,
dm  R.  -C.
where  Xy denotes  the second  (or cross) derivative  of X (X= R or C) with respect  to variables  i
andj (i,j  = n or m).
The second  condition  (number  of issues)  yields  the preferred  number  of issues for a given
group size or m  *(n). The number  of issues is a positive function  of the club size. Again, by
totally differentiating  (14), we can get:
(16)  anN  R. - C;-m.  C,.
AI  2.1Cm.C..
2  1The sign of the above expression  is in general ambiguous  but around the equilibrium  (where  Rn -
Cn = 0), it is positive. This implies that a country  acting unilaterally  would have fewer issues
than a group of countries  acting collectively  and that an increase  in the club size would raise the
preferred  number of issues. A member of a larger group is able to share the fixed (per issue)
international  negotiation  costs with its partners and would prefer dealing with more issues in
order to take advantage  of the cost sharing  and the economies  of scope associated  with the larger
number  of issues.
A very simple graphical  depiction  of this exercise  is offered  in Figure 4. The first (North-
East) quadrant  presents  the average  benefit as a function of n, for a fixed number of issues, m.
By using different  values of m, this yields the positive relationship  nN(m) that is shown in the
second  (South-East)  quadrant. In a similar fashion,  the fourth (North-West)  quadrant  determines
the equilibrium  number  of issues m, for a given club size n.  The resulting  positive relationship
mN(n) is shown in the second (South-East)  quadrant2l.  The resulting system of two equations
with two unknowns allows us to solve for the group size and the number of issues.  The
equilibrium  is given  by point 1 in the south-east  quadrant.
Consider  now the effect of an increase  in the degree  of similarity  among  the countries  (a
decrease  in a).  In the first quadrant,  N(n,  m-)  will expand  to the north-east  and the equilibrium  n,
for a given  m, moves  to the right. As a result, the curve nN(m) in the second  quadrant  will shift
to the right.  Similarly,  N(ni, m) will expand to the upper-left and the equilibrium m, for a
given  ni, moves to the left in the fourth  quadrant. Accordingly  the curve mN(n) in the south-east
21 As far  as stability  is concerned,  it can be computed  that the slope  of nN(m)  is  less  than the
slope  of the inverse  of mN(n).
22.Figure  4: Simultaneous  Determination  of n and m
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mquadrant shifts down.  The resulting change is a multiplier-type effect on m and n as is shown in
Figure  4. The new equilibrium is denoted by point 2.  A greater similarity among countries,
therefore, will increase both the group size and the number of issues.
The effect of an increase in the international negotiation costs (x) can be shown to be the
same as that of a decrease in  a. N(n, mW)  in the first quadrant moves down and to the right and
N(ni,  m) in the fourth quadrant shifts to the left. . As a result, the curve nN(m) in the second
quadrant will shift to the right and mN(n) in the south-east quadrant shifts down.  This will in
turn  increase  both  the  number  of  issues  and  the  group  size  as  the  countries  want  to  take
advantage of the cost sharing between members as well as the economies of scope due to larger
number of issues.
3.2  "Log-rolling"
So far, countries have been assumed symmetric.  In this section, countries differ in terms of the
issues they are concerned with.  In many cases, a union sometimes bargains with outside parties
over issues that are of direct concern only to some of its members.  Some countries may not even
have a national position on certain matters.  Still, those members who are not directly interested
in the issues are likely to prefer that the bargaining process does not break down.  One reason for
this is that a breakdown of negotiations over one issue might entail failure in all the other issues.
The  formation  of  a  regional  grouping  between  countries  with  different  interests  allows  the
countries to "tade"  or to "sell" their support for issues that are important to other members in
23exchange for support for issues that are important to themselves.  This logrolling between the
member countries can end up giving each country what it could not get on an unilateral basis 22.
This  issue  iis very  relevant  in  foreign  policy  coordination  between  independent
microstates.  CARICOM countries, for example, used this "exchange of support" method to get
Caribbean  nationals elected  to key  international positions  such  as Commonwealth  Secretary-
General and ACP Secretary-General.  On some issues, it is possible that the group delegates the
formulation of the joint regional position to a subgroup of its members if no other members are
SSe23. interested in the issues
We can modi[fy  the basic model to take the logrolling issue into account.  To make the
point clear, we consider the extreme case where each country cares only about one issue and that
the issue is different for different countries.  Therefore, the number of countries will always equal
the number of issues or n = m.  As before, suppose that an individual country receives a gross
payoff of R(n) , R >0, from its issue. We can rewrite the net benefit that a country gets by joining
a n-member group as:
22 This parallels the concept of "issue linkage" in that cooperation on one issue depends on
cooperation on other issues.  Spagnolo (1996) finds that linking different policy games helps
sustain more policy cooperation given that the issues are substitutes with respect to the
governments' objective functions.  He also finds that cooperation on different issues are also
easier to sustain when they are "excludable" in the sense that any single deviant player can be
effectively punished by excluding her from the gains from cooperation while the other players go
on cooperating.
23 The issue of delegation of authority is addressed by Gatsios and Karp (1989, 1995) in a
different framework. They find that "... delegation [to set a common external policy] either to a
union member or a supra-national agent affects the union's  best response function ..." and can
increase a member's economic welfare.  They also show that if it is optimal to delegate, then the
more "aggressive" union member will be chosen to set the joint external policy stance.
24N(n) =R(n)-n.  C(n),  or,
(17)  X
N(n) = R(n) - n.[- + (n - 1)'  y(n)]
n
The first term on the right hand side is just the gross benefit that a country gets from its
own issue given that the n-1 other countries are supporting it.  The second term is the total cost
which could be interpreted as the cost of international negotiation (x) plus the cost of agreeing to
play and of actually playing the logrolling game  24.  In this case, a country might be willing to
lend support to its fellow members' position over issue i --even though it gains nothing from that
particular issue-- as long as it knows that the other members will do the same over issues that do
25 not concern them directly  . From this standpoint, the possibility of logrolling makes collective
action more likely and the benefits of being a member of a large group larger.
Outsiders will be applying for membership to a n-member club so long as they can gain
from collective action relative to acting unilaterally, or:
(18)  N(n)  > N(l),  or,
R(n) - R(1) > n.(n - 1)' y(n).
24  For convenience, the cost of agreeing to play the game is assumed to have the same
specifications as the regional costs that we have used in previous sections.  This does not have to
be the case.
25 This could be modeled as a "trigger strategy repeated game":  As long as everybody plays
truthfully, the logrolling process will run smoothly and each country will get what it could not
get by itself.  If the intertemporal discount rate is small enough, the result would take the form of
self enforcing "implicit contracts" and cooperation would be the equilibrium outcome.
25On the other hand, if membership is selective, insiders will accept new membership as long as
the new member does not make them worse off, or:
(19)  d)=  Rn  - (n -1).y(n).[l  +  - - y(n)]  2 0,
where 6(n) =  - y (n).n  is the elasticity of the function y(n).
Note  that if  n is large enough  and  q(n)>], then  the above expression  will always be
unambiguously positive.  That is, an increase in the club size will always be beneficial for the
insiders and hence collective action would always be preferred to unilateral action (irrespective
of entry condition).  In this case, the club will grow until it includes all potential members.
4.  Case Study:  CARICOM
This section presents a case study of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) which exemplifies
the  regional  approach to  international  relations  by  "microstates".  All  fourteen  CARICOM
member states experience the problems of political and economic viability that are engendered
by extremely small size 26. Due to their sizes, the CARICOM economies were characterized by (i)
acute  external  dependence,  (ii)  limited  administrative  and  managerial  resources,  (iii)  costly
26 The CARICOM countries are Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize,
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago and the non-independent territory of Montserrat.
Only Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago have populations that exceed one million.
26provision of socio-economic infrastructure and services due to unfavorable economies of scale,
(iv) constraints imposed on economic decision-making by small domestic markets and limited
productive resources, and (v) extreme vulnerability to military or other security threats. Regional
integration has, thus,  long been identified as an essential element in the strategies for survival
and development adopted by these countries.
CARICOM was established sequentially.  The original Treaty establishing  CARICOM
was signed in  1973 by Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago.  By mid-1974,
seven more countries (Belize, Dominica,  Grenada, St. Lucia,  St.Vincent, the  Grenadines, and
Montserrat) had joined  after considerable negotiation.  The Bahamas was accepted  as a new
member  in  1983.  In  1991, the British Virgin  Island  and the  Turks and  Caicos Island  were
granted Associate Membership.  Surinarne acceded to membership in 1995.
The main problem confronting CARICOM is the small size and the undiversified nature
of the economies of its member nations.  Accordingly, even if the trade barriers between the
members were completely abolished, the level of intra-regional trade would likely still be quite
small. IADB (1995) reports that "trade within CARICOM has been minimal, and intraregional
investment  is  virtually  nonexistent".  From  its  creation  in  1973,  aggregate  intra-CARICOM
exports have accounted for around 10 percent of the area's total exports. 27
27 Recognizing the limitations of CARICOM in the area of economic integration, Caribbean
leaders decided to form a new organization for economics and trade called the Association of
Caribbean States (ACS) in 1994. The members of this new grouping would be the 25 countries
of the Caribbean Basin. The ACS would have a total market of around 200 million persons, with
an estimated Gross Domestic Product of US$500 billion, and annual trade worth some US$180
billion. (IADB, 1995)
27However,  CAR1COM has  often  served  as  an  effective  political  instrument  in joint
negotiations on trade and investment with larger countries or regional trade blocs. (Byron, 1994;
IADB, 1995) CARICOM includes provisions for economic cooperation on fiscal and monetary
policy, as well as joint planning for industrial development.  It also encompasses a number of
agencies of functional  cooperation, which provide essential socio-economic services on a pooled
regional basis. It  was inatended  to equip the region, an English-speaking  enclave in a  largely
Spanish-speaking area,  with  a  more powerful  voice  and  presence to  defend  its  interests  in
international affairs.
In  an  nutshell,  the  group  has  three  main  areas  of  activity:  economic  integration;
cooperation in non-economic areas (e.g., health, education and transport) and the operation of
certain common services; and the coordination of foreign policies of independent member states.
Despite the last area, political integration is not  envisaged.  Foreign policy coordination was
particularly active in four areas: the negotiation of preferential  access to European and North
American markets 28; attempts to obtain consistent and remunerative commodity prices; obtaining
larger  flows of concessionary  finance to the  region; and  finally  a heightened  profile for the
Caribbean in multilateral  institutions in order to voice the concerns of the regional states on the
issues of economic, environmental and territorial security (Byron, 1994).  In none of these areas
would a small country acting unilaterally, have been successful.  Clearly, the number and nature
of the issues to be dealt with made the establishment of CARICOM and the formulation of a
28 The main issue here is whether CARICOM will continue to enjoy privileged access to
European Markets (under the Lome Convention and the GSP), the USA (under the Caribbean
Basin Initiative) and Caniada  (under CARIBCAN).
28"CARICOM position"  necessary.  CARICOM countries were/are involved, among other things,
in the ACP-EU, GATT/WTO, UNCTAD, UNCLOS (UN Conference on the Laws of the Sea)
negotiations as well  as in various  commissions  or joint  councils with  Cuba,  Canada, Japan,
Mexico, US, the FTAA, the OAS,  the G3 (Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia), the SELA, and many
more.  A microstate would hardly have  sufficient human, physical  or financial  capacities to
unilaterally conduct fruitful negotiations in so many areas.
CARICOM  members  have  varying  degrees  of  development  which  made  regional
negotiations often difficult.  Within  CARICOM itself, the smaller territories (the seven  small
Eastern Caribbean territories) continued their own institutional arrangements for  an economic
and political  subgrouping which  evolved into the tightly  integrated  Organization of Eastern
Caribbean  States (OECS).  The creation of the OECS considerably enhanced their individual
administrative capabilities, and their collective bargaining weight, both within CARICOM and
internationally.
The region acquired bargaining power at the very highest level of North-South politics.
Representatives  of  CARICOM  countries  took  the  lead  in  formulating  and  articulating  the
positions of the ACP Group in the negotiation of Lome Conventions.  By trading each other's
support, the CARICOM nations succeeded in getting their nationals elected to key international
positions  such  as  Commonwealth  Secretary-General  and  ACP  Secretary-General 29. In  the
process, they ensured that the region's interests in the areas of commodity trade and development
29 It should be noted that the CARICOM candidate lost out to Argentina for the post of President
of the United Nations General Assembly in 1988. The CARICOM countries also failed to secure
any seats on the governing board of UNESCO in 1989. (Byron 1994)
29cooperation were taken into account.  They also consolidated multilateral links with other parts
of the developing world, and established themselves as full participants in the activities of the
United  Nations,  despite  that  organization's  earlier  ambivalence  on  the  issue  of  microstate
membership.  CARICOM  countries  focused  on  getting  the  U.N.  organs  to  address  the
development needs  of small  island developing  states. Finally, they  succeeded in  collectively
negotiating an impressive range of preferential market access (e.g., CARIBCAN with Canada,
CBI with the USA,  and GSP (along with other developing nations) with the EU).
5.  Conclusions
This paper analyzes the circumstances  under which  a regional  grouping  between microstates
would emerge.  The simple model used focuses on negotiation costs and bargaining power rather
than  on the  traditional  "static"  costs  and  benefits  analysis  of  regional  integration.  This  is
legitimate because, given the small size of the countries concerned, as well as the limited number
of products produced and their similarity, trade integration itself could only produce minuscule
costs or benefits.  Microstates are likely to gain more, and thus be more concerned with saving
on international negotiation costs and having a larger voice in the international arena.  Even if
our focus is on microstates, our analysis is general enough to be applied to many other areas (e.g.
developing countries, CaLirns  group, nation building ...).
Our model is sinmple  (without being simplistic) and intuitive. Yet, the analysis provides
and formalizes many useful insights.  It is found that the equilibrium group size depends on the
existing entry condition.  Free membership or free entry leads to an inefficiently large group due
30to the congestion caused by the newcomers.  A selective membership without the possibility of
side payment, on the other hand,  leads to an  inefficiently small group.  The possibility for the
outsider to make compensation payments to the insiders, or alternatively the possibility for the
insiders to charge the outsider an entry fee,  takes care of the externalities and yields a socially
optimal group size.
Irrespective  of  the  entry  condition,  it  is  shown that  the  likelihood  of  a  cooperative
solution between microstates, as well as the equilibrium group size, increase as the number of
issues to be tackled increases.  An increase in the degree of similarity between the countries also
is associated with an increase in the group size. Also, an increase in the international negotiation
costs, as well as a decrease in the regional costs, raises the likelihood of collective action and
expands the group.  A simple extension of the basic model shows that the possibility of trading
each other's support on different issues (logrolling) makes collective action even more likely and
easier to sustain.
The particular case of CARICOM was then examined to see the relevance of the model in
the real world.  Despite its  relatively limited trade and  investment impacts,  CARICOM was
successful in serving as a political instrument in joint negotiations on trade and investment with
larger countries and  regional trade  blocs.  By establishing  a  union,  the CARICOM  countries
succeeded in making their voices heard on a variety of issues in a way that none of them could
have done unilaterally.
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